for what they signified about white Australian values and prejudices. 1 Recent historical studies of colonial criminal law affecting Indigenous peoples have also generally focussed on inter-racial offences 2 However significant such studies may be for understanding settler-Indigenous relations in their broader context, the reality is that most encounters of Indigenous people with the Australian criminal justice system were more commonly on account of offences committed against each other (inter se), as they continue to be. 3 This was true of the frontier period as Broome has recently argued 4 and also true of the decades after the frontier conflicts. Foundational cases like Murrell (NSW 1836), Wewar (Western Australia, 1842) and Larry (South Australia, 1847) resolved the question-mark hanging over colonial jurisdiction in such inter se offences. But such resolution was just the starting point of debates over how Aboriginal people would be brought into court, who would witness for or against them, how their guilt as to intention to commit a crime would be determined, and how they would be punished if found guilty. 5 In this article I examine briefly the available evidence about the scale of inter se offending as it found its way through Australian courts historically. I then consider some selected cases that highlight the debates occurring within and outside court-rooms about the role of criminal trials and punishments in responding to inter se violence. Through those cases we see the degree to which Australian law in the courts came to hear
Aboriginal witnesses, to interpret the context of Aboriginal offending, to adjudicate guilt and to mitigate punishment. In parliament, bureaucratic offices and courts, Australian law-makers asserted that there was one criminal law in Australia -but persistently gave 3 way to the reality that in dealing with Indigenous defendants they were frequently confronting ways of life and thought that were remote from the Australian mainstream.
How many?
After the assertion of jurisdiction in the various Australian colonies -itself an index of the transition from wars of occupation to settler hegemony -inter-racial offences were only a fraction of the cases involving Aboriginal offenders brought into the courts for inter-personal violence. Most came to court for killing their kin, wives (more rarely husbands), fellow countrymen with whom they were disputing, or occasionally strangers to their country. Aboriginal people came to court on account of both Aboriginal and white witnessing, they were tried on the evidence of both Aborigines and whites, and they were more often than not saved from the extreme penalty of the law by the exercise of mercy, an outcome of recommendations by white juries and judges.
How common were prosecutions of Aboriginal people for inter-personal violence after the assertion of jurisdiction, and how were they treated? The answer depends on the jurisdiction -but in general over the century after 1850 there was a north-south divide, or more accurately one between the south-east of Australia and the rest of the continent.
Although criminal justice statistics are notoriously idiosyncratic across time and place in Australia, it is possible to draw some conclusions from the variety of studies of capital punishment, the mandatory sanction for homicide for most of this period in most of the states. Other evidence may be drawn from studies of inquests, examination of prison records and of course the records of the criminal courts themselves. Detailed studies that take into account the full scope of offences are very rare, even though the richness of Australian criminal justice archives allows the possibility. Many of these (twenty-four defendants) were found not guilty or were discharged when the prosecution was withdrawn. Defendants found guilty of these capital crimes at a time when the mandatory penalty was death always benefited from a reprieve -either commutation to a short term of imprisonment or even a pardon. Such leniency was predictably absent in the sentencing outcomes of those trials of Aborigines charged with killing a European settler in these years -although only a minority was actually found guilty in such trials. There were at least seventy-three so prosecuted, but a majority of these defendants (thirty-eight of them) were found not guilty or had the prosecution discontinued (typically over lack of evidence). Of the thirty-five found guilty of either murder or manslaughter of a European settler, twenty-three Aborigines were executed between 1839 and 1862. 6 The contrast between inter se and inter-racial cases demands little explanation -beyond reference to the expectation that the ultimate terror of the law would be used as an exemplary lesson to Aborigines who were commonly marshalled to 5 observe executions, as well as a demonstration to the settler community that their desire for retribution would be acknowledged. 12 Only three of those convicted of either manslaughter or murder appear to have been executed, all the rest having their sentences commuted. The killing rampage of Jimmy Governor and his brother in the early twentieth century was a cause of sensation -but the intensity of its violence helped amplify its significance in the imagination of long-settled New South
Wales. The remaining cases included both inter-racial and inter se cases, with limited reference to the cultural differences which nevertheless led juries and judges to lend support very frequently to the case for mercy. Typically the cases were only briefly reported. But there were exceptions, such as the 1875 prosecution of Jacky Whyman for the murder of his friend Paddy Hadigaddy at Cobargo on the south coast of New South Wales, a trial in which consciousness of imagined and real black and white differences in sensibility and morality preoccupied all in the courtroom. There is one exception -the heavy prosecution of Aborigines for cattle-killing, especially in Western Australia. 14 
8
After the pacification of Indigenous life through subordination or incorporation, the rates of incarceration of Aboriginal people in the most settled parts of Australia were less frequent until much later in the twentieth century. The explanation for this is found in the separation of Aboriginal people from the settler mainstream but also in the management of their own business by Indigenous people. 15 Violence resulting in death almost always attracted police attention after the establishment of self-government -but other forms of offending and harm were less visible, less the concern of state agencies and (importantly) may have been handled by preference within Indigenous communities.
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On trial
Against this brief survey of the incidence of prosecution of inter se violence I turn now to examine the way in which these prosecutions worked.
I have outlined above the reasons for concluding that the majority of cases in which 20 Davy had disappeared from the camp, crossing the border into New South Wales.
Arrested within the year he was brought to trial in Victoria on a charge of murder.
Almost immediately the Crown Prosecutor disowned the charge, telling the jury during the opening address that they might see it as 'manslaughter'. 'Aboriginals', he suggested, 'were not be looked upon, perhaps as similar to Europeans in such cases'. As a man living between two cultures John Bango had already appeared to be on trial in the inquest, being asked to account for his lack of intervention. In the course of the later criminal proceedings he avowed that he himself 'would not hit a woman in return'. Matilda added context to the event -all involved had a 'little beer' Davy, according to Matilda, was wanting to be 'coolie'
or 'half-husband' to Big Mary. Whether through jealousy or otherwise Kitty had struck Davy on the head with a stick, then run off towards the men's camp. According to Bango, 'Davy followed her, caught hold of her and "hammered her" in the chest. Matilda tried to part them, but she was unable to do so'. As described by both witnesses Davy had then knocked Kitty down and 'stamped his foot "very hard" upon her chest'. She died about half an hour later, after returning to the women's camp'. As John Bango told the inquest, none of the men had intervened, prompting the coroner's question to him. 21 . In the end, the jury agreed with the Crown Prosecutor. Davy was found guilty of the lesser charge of manslaughter and the judge sentenced him to six months imprisonment, after a hearing which had involved Aboriginal witnesses alone. 22 The sentence appears light -but there appears no explicit address to the cultural or social context of the killing, in spite of the strong evidence of Indigenous cultural organisation shaping the camp (the gendered division above all), and the performance of the violence (the open acknowledgment of jealousy, the use of the stick by Kitty, the seeming restraint of the men observing the attack, treating it as Davy's business).
23
Aboriginal witnesses in the prosecution of Davy at Echuca showed no reluctance to engage in the process leading to his conviction. Such evidence suggests how the courts had become useful to Aboriginal people themselves as an instrument of justice to redress the damage done by violence resulting in death. In the famous New South Wales case of R v Murrell that had established jurisdiction over inter se killing, the victim's associates had made it clear that they wanted the killers tried in the 'English courts'. 24 From the early years of the colonial era Aboriginal people took the initiative in bringing to justice the most serious offences in their communities, looking to the settler courts to achieve a resolution.
25
Aboriginal witnesses to the escalating row between Harry and Tilly described a woman determined to leave a violent man, and return to her relatives. According to the statement of her closest friend in the camp, Tilly had wanted to leave Harry because he was so cruel to their children. In the face of Tilly's rejection of him over the course of a Sunday afternoon and evening, Harry grew more and more belligerent, alternately threatening he would kill or shoot her, and then accepting that she would go, insisting on them shaking hands. In retrospect the insistence was threatening.
A notable example is found in the 1910 case of Harry Murphy, found guilty of the manslaughter of his wife Tilly, after he killed her with the blow of a tomahawk at the camp they shared with others on a pastoral property near Taroom in central
Queensland. It appeared a stereotypical case of domestic violence. For the West Australian such an outcome was a moral hazard to victims of crime. 'There can be no doubt', the editorial continued, 'that numbers of unfortunate aboriginals meet with violent deaths owing to the leniency with which horrible barbarities on the part of the natives are treated whenever there is the slightest ground for attributing them to "tribal custom".' The problem lay with 'town juries' which were inclined to lump all Aborigines together' they 'imagine that, in the case of the crimes of those who have been brought up under the influences of civilization, tribal custom is as valid an excuse as it might be where the perpetrator is really imbued with the spirit of aboriginal law and tradition'.
31
In truth the case of Ben Ben's homicide of Lizzie was one whose customary contexts were obscure but by no means absent. Indeed the only motivation for Ben Ben's action that emerged from any of the inquiries conducted by police was found in the consistent story presented by three witnesses that he had killed Lizzie because his own mother had died some weeks before. That was what he himself told the arresting police sergeant, who carefully recorded that he had warned Ben Ben not to say anything to him; it was also given in evidence by Ben Ben's partner Minnie, whose status as 'his woman' was no barrier to her being a compellable witness in colonial courts.
Leniency of the kind exhibited in the case of Ben Ben was no mercy but an encouragement of further atrocities. 32 An associate of Ben Ben, Woodar, also testified that his friend had told him that he killed the girl Lizzie because his mother was dead. In Ben Ben's own statement reported by the arresting police constable he claimed that another Aboriginal man had said to him that 'Lizzie's no relation of yours and your mother died and you ought to kill her ... if you don't kill her you are a coward'. Ben Ben said he had used no spear; he had strangled her. Medical evidence suggested the same, although the body was not inspected before its condition had deteriorated to a skeletal state. 33 The murder had taken place at a sheep farm at Minigen near Williams, a small town on the road from Albany to Perth. Lizzie was described by Johanna Barron, wife of sheep No evidence was led as to the customs or norms which might have justified or explained Ben Ben's actions. All was left to imputation. In this sense the West Australian editorial pointed to a reality of colonial court practice when it came to dealing with offences between Aborigines. Courts were all too ready to accept references to 'custom' or 'barbaric practices' as sufficient in itself to explain violent events that were beyond the understanding of prosecutors, judges or juries. In prosecuting the case the AttorneyGeneral put it to the jury that the murder of Lizzie was 'one of those tribal outrages in which a life was sacrificed in deference to some custom prevailing among the aboriginal inhabitants of the colony -that where one of their relatives died, it was advisable, or necessary or expedient that they should take the life of someone else'. This 'barbarous custom' could form no legal defence 'since all classes of the community were subject to the British law, which makes no distinction between black or white'. The defence counsel was no more informative on context or 'custom', but asked the jury to accompany their inevitable verdict 'with a recommendation to mercy on the ground that the outrage was the outcome of a tribal custom'. The jury complied. 35 After the passing of the sentence, the commutation was little more than a formality. Ben Ben was sent to Rottnest -his own death was reported from there within three years of his confinement. give evidence, the case rested entirely on the prisoners' own statements. In spite of defence counsel asking the jury whether they would find two white men guilty of wilful murder on such evidence, the jury found Dick not guilty but Willie guilty, attaching a recommendation to mercy 'on account of the customs of the Aboriginals'.
Recommending the prisoner to the mercy of the Crown, Judge Chubb of the Supreme Court did not elaborate on precisely what customs were involved, leaving the inference to be drawn from his brief statement of the facts of the case. These had involved evidence of the two men (along with a third whose absence from the trial was unexplained) having sliced flesh from the arms which they had later cooked and eaten. In court one police officer with fifteen years experience in the North alluded to a putative customary basis for the killing, in the fact that Frank was said to be a Townsville black and so a stranger to the area. It was, he told the court, 'a common thing in N. Queensland for blacks to kill strange blacks who come into their district. 
Conclusion
The contemporary legacy of contention over the nature and role of so-called customary law can only be understood adequately through an appreciation of the historical construction of the very idea of 'custom' as it was deployed in courts and in clemency decisions. When criminal law's authority over Indigenous people became a test of Crown sovereignty in Australia the outcome was something that inevitably entailed colonialism's logic and invoked the cultural assumptions of those who bore responsibility for bringing killers before courts. In the little studied archives of Australia's criminal courts over the century between the 'perfection of sovereignty' 39 and the emerging struggles for Aboriginal citizenship rights we also find much more -justice administered in conditions that unsettled law's comfort in its own procedures and its capacity to understand the actions of those whose lives it judged. We have seen in this brief scan of cases involving Aboriginal defendants who had killed other Aboriginal men and women and children, the way in which justice alternately ignored the cultural and social contexts and meanings of Indigenous behaviour or else folded the fleeting apprehension of these contexts into a general assumption about the continuing influence of 'custom' on Aboriginal people. In the process law was wielded less heavily than might be expected, in ways which we conclude might be both benign to defendants and a hazard to the potential victims of violence.
The encounters of Australian criminal law with Indigenous people did not flow only one way. Law was changed by its encounter, having to adjust to the realities it dealt with in the continuing colonial problem of how to govern an Indigenous population. Over the longer term the ways in which criminal law was changed included evidence (the admission of Aboriginal testimony), juries (the Northern Territory amendments of the 1920s restricting the use of juries in criminal law to capital offences), the establishment of special jurisdictions (Native Courts in Western Australia), the recognition of customary wives as entitled to exclusion from compulsion to testify against their partners (legislated in the Northern Territory and Western Australia in the 1930s), and especially in the frequency of sentence mitigation, the most enduring outcome of the encounter with 'custom', and one that survived (controversially) into the twenty-first century. 40 The traces of the emergence of the idea of 'custom' as a mitigating factor in sentencing are readily discovered in the nineteenth century criminal calendars -but it is only when we delve into the circumstances of such trials that we come to see the ways in which 'custom' was both elastic in its meaning and an avoidance of detailed inquiry into the context of offending. In this way the encounter of Australian criminal law with the results
